New Delhi: There is little doubt that Israel’s attack on Iran was operationally effective, and it will have an influence on Tehran’s ballistic missile capabilities, as well as its decision to attack Israel again in the near future. Israel’s cause was stronger than ever; any limited attack would be insufficient to discourage the Islamic Republic from launching a third attack. However, this short-term success hides the fact that Israel may have missed a golden opportunity to halt Iran’s nuclear programme.
This is not to convey it was an easy decision.
Whether To Attack Or Not?
The US put significant pressure on Israel not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, offering incentives, such as lending the THAAD missile defence system and continuing to supply certain weapons. Along with these incentives, the Biden Administration possibly hinted, or outright warned, that weapons shipments might stop if things escalated too much.
There was no certainty that attacking Iran’s nuclear programme would completely stop Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from trying to build a nuclear weapon. In fact, some believed it could push him to speed up efforts to develop one, giving him protection from future Israeli strikes. Despite everything, this was, possibly, Israel’s best opportunity to halt Iran’s nuclear programme and it might have been the best chance they will ever get.
Even though there were potential risks, the most serious dangers had greatly decreased compared to the past 10 years. This made the situation an ideal opportunity for Israel to take a chance, as the threats they once faced were no longer as severe, creating a more favourable moment to act than they had seen in a long time.
First, Jerusalem had more justification to strike the nuclear programme than at any other point of time in history. Despite pressure from the US and EU to avoid, or limit, any attack on Iran, Israel’s allies would have been more likely to back its decision to strike Iran’s nuclear programme, especially after Khamenei ordered two major attacks on Israel in April and again on October 1.
According to Jerusalem Post, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s response to Iran’s April attack was limited to a single, precise strike on an anti-aircraft S-300 missile system. Considering that, after Israel’s restrained response, Khamenei chose to launch another attack earlier this month, Israel had a stronger argument that a limited strike would not be enough to stop the Islamic Republic from attempting a third attack.
The general belief has been that Tehran is cautious and avoids taking direct action against Israel using conventional weapons, not to speak of nuclear weapons. Following two major attacks, with more than 300 air threats in April and over 180 ballistic missiles on October 1, Netanyahu could argue that Khamenei’s approach has shifted and he is now prepared to take action.
It is one thing to hold off and risk Iran getting nuclear weapons if one believes they only want them for defence. But it is another matter when their actions have crossed many new lines and no one can tell what they may do next. Another reason against bombing Iran’s nuclear programme has been the fear that it could lead the Islamic Republic to fire ballistic missiles at Israel, potentially causing thousands of deaths and significant damage to key parts of the country.
At that time, there was a lot of doubt about how well the Arrow missile defence system would work against ballistic missiles, since it had not really been tested before this year. Some US officials believe that, between April and October, with only a limited number of ballistic missile launchers, Khamenei may have already used his strongest attacks twice.
Since Israel has shown that Iran’s ballistic missile attacks are not enough to cause major destruction—with minimal damage in April and more on October 1, but nothing that hindered IDF operations or caused deaths—Jerusalem may now be less worried about how Tehran retaliates. The next major threat linked to Iran’s nuclear programme has always been its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. Reports suggest that, if the IDF struck Iran’s nuclear facilities, Khamenei would order both groups to launch severe attacks on Israel.
When Hezbollah had an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and Hamas over 15,000, it was thought that these proxies could overpower Israel’s air defences with a massive number of rockets, including long-range precision ones. This could have led to thousands of Israeli deaths, along with whatever damage Iran may cause and widespread destruction of key infrastructure.
Now that Hamas has been militarily crushed, it no longer poses a rocket danger of any kind. Hezbollah seems able to keep northern Israel under attack for months and regularly target Tel-Aviv. However, since Israel started hitting it hard in mid-September, the Lebanese group seems to have lost the ability to carry out any surprise, large-scale attack on Israel.
What About The Rewards?
A military strike against Iran’s nuclear programme may set it back years. Tehran may recover and the nuclear expertise that Israel and the West have mistakenly allowed it to develop in recent years cannot be erased.
The claim by experts that Israel cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear programme due to its widespread locations and deep underground facilities without the use of US bunker-buster bombs is incorrect. For instance, Israel does not need to completely destroy Iran’s underground Fordow nuclear facility; it can simply cause a collapse, damaging the site and making it unusable.
If Iran tries to rebuild, and appears to be working towards nuclear weapons again in the next two years, Israel may launch another attack. Relying on multiple attacks to target Iran’s nuclear programme is a highly problematic approach. However, the world Israel faces after October 7, 2023, is far more chaotic and unstable than before.
On the other hand, if Israel keeps showing it is willing to use force against nuclear threats, Khamenei may decide that building nuclear weapons is not worth it. Instead, Iran has now experienced two rounds of firing ballistic missiles at Israel and two rounds of witnessing Israeli strikes. This may help it better prepare for future attacks, all the while not losing any part of its nuclear programme. Israel may have missed a chance to directly address the nuclear threat and avoid depending solely on ‘hope’.
(The author of this article is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach him at: girishlinganna@gmail.com)
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